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POLYGRAPH ADMISSIBILITY IN MASSACHUSETTS
UNDER THE NEW STANDARD
"It takes two to speak the truth, -- one to speak, and another to hear."'
I. INTRODUCTION
A recent change in the standard of admissibility for scientific expert
testimony provided the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court with an
opportunity to set predictable guidelines for polygraph admissibility.2 In the
past, the court set polygraph admission apart from all other types of scientific
evidence with a changing and unpredictable standard. The previous standard for
admitting expert testimony based on a scientific theory or process required a
finding that the relevant community of scientists generally accepted the theory
or process.3 While the court originally rejected polygraph evidence for failing
to meet that standard, it later ruled polygraph evidence admissible by creating
an exception.5
Eventually, however, the court eliminated this exception for polygraph
evidence, returning to the present per se rule against admissibility.6 The court
eliminated this exception by noting the polygraph's continued failure to attain
general acceptance, its unreliability, irrelevance, and overly prejudicial effects
upon juries.7 While the new standard of admissibility allows for the admission
of a scientific method or theory not yet generally accepted, it requires that the
proponent establish its reliability and relevance.' Furthermore, even with
Henry David Thoreau, Wednesday.
See Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 26, 641 N.E.2d 1342, 1349 (1994)
(adopting a new standard to determine admissibility of scientific evidence).
' Commonwealth v. Fatalo, 346 Mass. 266, 269, 191 N.E.2d 479, 481 (1963)
(finding general acceptance of a scientific theory a prerequisite to judicial acceptance).
4 Id. at 270, 641 N.E.2d at 481 (holding polygraphy lacks general acceptance).
s See Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 365 Mass. 421, 429, 313 N.E.2d 120, 126
(1974) (holding polygraph results admissible in limited circumstances despite no general
acceptance).
6 See Commonwealth v. Mendes, 406 Mass. 201, 212, 547 N.E.2d 35, 41 (1989)
(returning to strict application of Frye general acceptance rule for polygraphy).
7 See id. at 211, 547 N.E.2d at 40-41 (reviewing "shortcomings" of the polygraph
method).
8 See Lanigan, 419 Mass. at 26, 641 N.E.2d at 1349 (reasoning that evidentiary
relevance and reliability determine scientific validity).
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reliability and relevance established, a court can always exclude evidence if its
prejudicial effects outweigh its probative value.9

This article analyzes Massachusetts as well as federal precedent governing
the reliability, relevance, and prejudicial effects of polygraph. Such analysis will
help determine whether the use of polygraphy can meet the new standard.

II. MECHANICS OF POLYGRAPH TESTING
While several methods of polygraph testing exist, the control question
examination remains the most commonly used technique."0 In conducting a
control question exam, a polygraph examiner questions a subject hooked up to
a machine which measures and records involuntary bodily responses including
blood pressure, pulse rate, respiration, and perspiration." The underlying theory
assumes that an examinee's untruthful response elicits involuntary, measurable
physiological changes in the body caused by fear or anxiety.'2
The questions asked by the polygraph examiner include both relevant and
control questions. 3 Relevant questions pertain directly to the criminal activity
the defendant stands accused of, while purposely vague control questions relate
only to acts similar to the crime in question.'4 Control questions, designed to

' FED. R. EVID. 403.
'0 See Mendes, 406 Mass. at 207, 547 N.E.2d at 38 (finding polygraphers
investigating criminal incidents usually employ control question technique).
" See Commonwealth v. Vitello, 376 Mass. 426,431, 381 N.E.2d 582, 586 (1978)
(outlining the basis of polygraphy) citing Skolnick, Scientific Theory and Scientific
Evidence: An Analysis of Lie-Detection, 70 YALE L.J. 694, 700 (1961). Pneumographs

strapped around the examinee's chest and abdomen measure the rate and depth of
respiration. Susan M. Flanagan, Employer - Employee Relations -- The Employee
PolygraphProtectionAct: EliminatingPolygraph Testing in PrivateEmployment is Not

TheAnswer, 11 S. ILL. U. L.J. 355, 355 n.9 (1987). A blood pressure cuff placed around
the examinee's bicep measures cardiovascular activity, and electrodes attached to the
examinee's fingertips measure perspiration, termed galvanic skin response. Id
32 See A Juvenile, 365 Mass. at 426, 313 N.E.2d at 124 (discussing polygraphy's
fundamental assumptions). Most agree a polygraph machine, when competently operated,
accurately measures and records involuntary bodily responses. See W. Thomas Halbeib,
UnitedStates v. Piccononna:The Eleventh CircuitAdds Another Approach to Polygraph

Evidence in the FederalSystem, 80 KY. L.J. 225, 230-31 (1991-92) (reviewing mechanics
of polygraph technique). Not everyone, however, agrees with the underlying assumption
that an untruthful response causes fear or anxiety and the accompanying physiological
changes. Id.
See Commonwealth v. Mendes, 406 Mass. 201, 207, 547 N.E.2d 35, 38 (1989)

(describing control question technique).
14Id.
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arouse an examinee that has truthfully answered relevant questions, provide a
basis for comparison with the relevant questions." 5 Specifically, when control
questions elicit stronger physiological reactions than relevant questions the
examiner concludes that the subject answered the relevant question truthfully. 6
Alternatively, when the relevant questions produce stronger physiological
responses than control questions the examiner concludes that the subject
answered deceptively.' 7 Polygraph examiners form their expert opinions
regarding a defendant's truthfulness based on more than just the charts produced
by the polygraph machine."s The experts also consider information collected
prior to the exam, and pre- and post-test interviews with the examinee. 9
Initially, an examiner reads all reports concerning the alleged criminal
incident and speaks with police officers and attorneys involved in the case. °
After collecting this initial data, the examiner informs the examinee about the
test and the examinee's legal rights and inquires into medical problems or use
of drugs.2 Next, an examiner conducts a pretest interview with the examinee.2"
During this interview, the examiner convinces the examinee of the machine's
accuracy in detecting deception to heighten the examinee's physiological
reactions.' Finally, after administration of the exam, the examiner discusses the
test with the examinee to clarify certain responses. 4

15Id.
1" Id
17

Id.

" See Comnonwealth v. Vitello, 376 Mass. 426, 434-37, 381 N.E.2d 587-89 (1978)

(discussing phases of polygraph exam, which include data collection, pretest interview,
testing, and post test interview).
19 Id.

2'Id. at 434, 381 N.E.2d at 587.
21Id.
22Id.
' Commonwealth v. Vitello, 376 Mass. 426, 434, 381 N.E.2d 582, 587 (1978).
24 Id. at 437, 381 N.E.2d at 589. After the examiner has interpreted the charts
produced by the polygraph machine and observed the examinee's demeanor during the test,
the examiner forms a conclusion as to the examinee's veracity. Id. If the examiner
concludes the defendant lied, the post test interview provides the defendant a chance to
explain certain responses. Id. At this time the examiner may also attempt to obtain a

confession. Id.
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III. HISTORY OF POLYGRAPH ADMISSIBILITY IN MASSACHUSETTS
More than seventy years ago Frye v. United States" established the

"general acceptance" test.26 Frye required the exclusion of any novel scientific
evidence fixed in a principle which failed to gain "general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs."27 The Frye standard gained widespread
acceptance among federal and state courts because it is aimed at having those
most able to determine a process' reliability, namely the scientists in the
particular field, decide the validity of a method or theory.' While the standard
shifted the responsibility of determining the reliability of new scientific
techniques to the scientific community, judges still had to determine exactly what
it is that must be "generally accepted," define the relevant field in which to
search for acceptance, and decide what constitutes acceptance. 29
While advocates claimed the Frye standard promoted uniformity of
decision, many criticized the standard for responding too slowly in admitting
reliable scientific theories.3 Despite the criticism, this test prevailed throughout
state and federal courts for more than seventy years barring many forms of
scientific-based evidence, including DNA and polygraph results.3'
In 1963, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, ruling for the first time

293 F. Supp. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
Id. at 1014.

Id. The Frye Court ruled on the admissibility of systolic blood pressure, the
precursor to the modem polygraph machine. Id.The court offered no explanation nor cited
any authority when announcing the requirement that scientific theories must gain general
acceptance prior to admission into evidence. Id.
7

28

See Steven M. Egesdal, Note, The Frye Doctrine and Relevancy Approach

Controversy:An EmpiricalEvaluation, 74 GEO. L.J. 1769, 1769 (1986) (stating majority

of courts adhere to general acceptance standard in evaluating admission of scientific
evidence); Giannelli, The Admissibility ofNovel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States,

Half-CenturyLater, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1198 (1980) (observing courts uniformly
apply general acceptance standard); see also United States v. Skeens, 494 F.2d 1050, 1053
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (noting general acceptance standard uniformly applied in circuits); United
States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (stating standard assures most
qualified individuals speak to the scientific method).
' Harvard Law Review Association, Confronting The New Challengesof Scientific

Evidence, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1490, 1491 (May 1995).
" See United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529, 1532 n.7 (11th Cir. 1989)
(revisiting polygraph admissibility because Frye standard subject to wide criticism).
a'See Commonwealth v. Mendes, 406 Mass. 201, 202, 547 N.E.2d 35, 35-36 (1989)
(ruling polygraph evidence inadmissible for failure to gain general acceptance); see also
Commonwealth v. Cumin, 409 Mass. 218, 221-22, 565 N.E.2d 440, 442 (1991) (holding
DNA evidence inadmissible for failure to gain general acceptance).
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on the admissibility of polygraph evidence, adopted the Frye "general
acceptance" standard to exclude such evidence in criminal trials. 2 In
Commonwealth v. Fatalo,33 a defendant accused of assault and battery was
prevented from submitting favorable expert opinion testimony based on a
polygraph examination.34 The court clarified that the standard did not require
universal acceptance, but removal of substantial doubts about the test's or
theory's scientific reliability.35 After reviewing several publications, the court
found substantial doubt still surrounded the polygraph technique.' Despite
extensive testing, the court agreed with several scientists' reviews that the
claimed error rates were both inconclusive and misleading.37 Finding much
dispute surrounding the statistical accuracy of the polygraph test the court
concluded that admission would transform the trial into a "battle of the experts"
which would only confuse the jury.3 After this decision, polygraph test results
remained inadmissible in Massachusetts for the next ten years.39
Upon reexamination under the same admissibility standard, the Supreme
Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. A Juvenile0 maintained that polygraphy
failed to achieve general acceptance but then inexplicably held the results
admissible when certain requirements are satisfied.4 Reviewing the same
factors for indicia of general acceptance, the court concluded that substantial

' SeQ Commonwealth v. Fatalo, 346 Mass. 266, 269, 191 N.E.2d 479, 481 (1963)

(announcing theory must have general acceptance of relevant community of scientists prior
to judicial acceptance).
33346 Mass. 266,191 N.E.2d 479 (1963).
Id. at 269, 191 N.E.2d at 481.
Id. at 270, 191 N.E.2d at 481.

SId.
37 Commonwealth v. Fatalo, 346 Mass. 266, 270, 191 N.E.2d 479, 481 (1963).

N See id.at 286, 191 N.E.2d at 480 (fearing trial would focus on probative value of

test rather than guilt or innocence of defendant).
3' See Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 365 Mass. 421, 313 N.E.2d 120 (1974)

(reexamining admissibility of polygraph test results).
40
41

365 Mass. 421, 313 N.E.2d 120 (1974).
See id. at 424, 313 N.E.2d at 123 (recognizing polygraph's potential value in

criminal trial process). While the A Juvenile court strayed from the general acceptance
standard, it did not overrule its previous decision in Fatalo. Id. The court enunciated that

although the polygraph test had made evidentiary advances, it had not achieved general
acceptance. Id.; see also Vitello, 376 Mass. at 444, 381 N.E.2d at 592 (reviewing previous
holdings regarding polygraph evidence). The court "recognized in A Juvenile that failure
to achieve the standard of general acceptance need not freeze the evidentiary development
of the polygraph in view of its unique potential as a tool ofjustice." A Juvenile, 365 Mass.
at 424, 313 N.E.2d at 123.

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. 1I

advances had occurred in the field of polygraphy since its last ruling.42
According to the court, further testing had produced an increase in the reliability
of polygraphs.4 3 In fact, the court cited one scientific study that reported
laboratory test results with less than a one percent margin of error." With
polygraph tests administered under less than "laboratory conditions," however,
the court stressed the importance of a qualified examiner in producing reliable
results.4 s
Finding increased reliability, but not general acceptance, the court imposed
requirements upon the admissibility of polygraph test results in criminal trials.4'
These requirements mandated the defendant move for the application of a
polygraph test, agree to the admissibility of the results regardless of the outcome,
and voluntarily waive the constitutional right against self-incrimination.47
Further, the court imposed the requirement that trial judges conduct a voir dire
inquiry to establish the examiner's qualifications based on their experience,
training, and demonstrated ability. 4 Once the judge found the defendant fit to

take the exam and the methods used in administering the exam sound, the judge
retained discretion to admit the examiner's testimony for consideration with all
other evidence, as to innocence or guilt.49
The court warned that this "cautious first step" could lead to total rejection
of polygraph evidence or lead to a "useful tool of justice," but such a
determination must await testing in the courts.' While the court made an
exception to a strict application of the Frye test in the area of polygraphy, it
continued to strictly enforce Frye as a threshold requirement for evaluating other
forms of scientific evidence. 5' A Juvenile perhaps indicated that polygraph
42

A Juvenile, 365 Mass. at 422, 313 N.E.2d at 122.

Id. at 425, 313 N.E.2d at 123.
" Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 365 Mass. 421,428, 313 N.E.2d 120, 125 (1974).
43

See id. at 429-30, 313 N.E.2d at 126 (emphasizing importance of examiner's
qualifications to producing reliable polygraph results).
4s

Id. at 430-31, 313 N.E.2d at 126-27.
A Juvenile, 365 Mass. at 430-31, 313 N.E.2d at 126-27.
48 Id. at 429-30, 313 N.E.2d at 126.
49 See Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 365 Mass. 421, 429-30, 313 N.E.2d 120,
125-26 (1974) (leaving admissibility within trial judges' discretion). Prior to admitting
expert testimony concerning polygraph test results, trial judges should conduct a voir dire
of an examiner and make other appropriate findings. Id.
"
47

50Id. at 432-35, 313 N.E.2d at 127-29.
"' See Commonwealth v. Gomes, 403 Mass. 258, 265-66, 526 N.E.2d 1270, 1275
(1989) (requiring general acceptance of electrophoresis of dried blood stains);
Commonwealth v. Beausoleil, 397 Mass. 206, 214-15, 490 N.E.2d 788, 793-94 (1986)
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testing had, in the Supreme Judicial Court's opinion, almost reached general
acceptance in the relevant field to warrant such an exception.
After four years of testing in the courts, inconsistent conclusions about the
purposes for which courts could admit polygraph test results prompted
clarification from the Supreme Judicial Court in 1978.2 In Commonwealth v.
Vitello,53 after reviewing the polygraph method, the rules of evidence, and
various policy considerations, the court further limited the use of polygraph test
results to the impeachment or corroboration of a defendant's testimony.4 With
this ruling, the court limited the admissibility of polygraph results to cases where
the defendant chose to testify and excluded it as independent evidence of
innocence or guilt.
The Vitello court conducted a balancing test of the probative value and the
"probable dangers" of admitting polygraph testimony as independent evidence
of a defendant's guilt or innocence.5" The court concluded that the "probable
dangers" of admitting unfavorable polygraph test results to prove a defendant's
guilt outweighed the test's probative value.'
The "probable dangers"
considered by the court included, confusing and prejudicing the jury, intruding
upon the jury function, and wasting judicial time and resources.57 The court also
noted that the probative value of using polygraph results as independent
evidence diminished because the test results depended largely upon the
competence and subjectivity of the examiner.5"
While the polygraph method still failed to achieve general acceptance, and

(holding human leukocyte antigen testing in paternity cases to general acceptance standard);
Commonwealth v. Kater, 388 Mass. 519, 531-34, 447 N.E.2d 1190, 1198-99 (1983)
(applying general acceptance standard to hypnotically aided testimony); Commonwealth v.

Whynaught, 377 Mass. 14, 17, 384 N.E.2d 1212, 1215 (1979) (holding theory of radar

speedometer to general acceptance standard); Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191,
204-05, 327 N.E.2d 671, 678-79 (1975) (ruling scientific method of voice analysis
generally accepted).
'

Compare Commonwealth v. Moynihan, 376 Mass. 468, 478-79, 381 N.E.2d 575,

581 (1978) (affirming trial court's admission of polygraph evidence only for impeachment
or condboration), with Commonwealth v. Vitello, 376 Mass. 426, 453-54, 381 N.E.2d 582,
597 (1978) (reversing trial court's admission of unfavorable polygraph evidence in
prosecution's case-in-chief).
a 376 Mass. 426, 381 N.E.2d 582 (1978).
Id. at 453-54, 381 N.E.2d at 597.

ssId.

Id.
s, Commonwealth v. Vitello, 376 Mass. 426, 443-47, 381 N.E.2d 582, 592-94
(1978).
58id.
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despite its potential prejudicial effects, the Vitello court found the test results
sufficiently reliable for use in determining a defendant's credibility as a
witness. 9 The justifications for allowing the results for impeachment or
corroboration include encouraging the defendant to testify, which would improve
the truth seeking function of the trial process.'c In addition, the court found that
despite doubts about the method's reliability, using the test results promised a
more accurate way to aid the jury in assessing credibility than the introduction
of prior criminal behavior.6 Between 1974 and 1989, criminal defendants in
Massachusetts could use polygraph evidence to corroborate their testimony, and
the Commonwealth could use it to impeach a defendant's testimony.62
After fifteen years of allowing polygraph evidence for the limited purpose
of corroborating or impeaching a defendant's testimony, the Supreme Judicial
Court in Commonwealth v. Mendes63 held polygraph evidence inadmissible for
any purpose in criminal trials.' The court, overruling Vitello, claimed the
polygraph test's continued evidentiary shortcomings and the lack of general
scientific acceptance required a return to a strict application of the Frye rule.6"

The majority cited to "nearly unanimous rejection of such evidence by courts
throughout the United States (at least in the absence of stipulation)."
The Mendes court returned to the typical polygraph evidence objections:
subjectivity; dependence on the competence, experience, and education of the
examiner; likelihood of prejudicial impact and usurping the jury's role; and the
judicial burden of ensuring the presence of qualified experts and properly
administered exams.67 Mendes reaffirmed strict adherence to the general

acceptance standard, stating that "the rule is embedded in our law."

Thus,

absent a finding of general acceptance, or a change in the standard of

" Id. at 453-54, 381 N.E.2d at 597.
'0 Id. at 455, 381 N.E.2d at 598.
61Id.
- Commonwealth v. Mendes, 406 Mass. 201, 212, 547 N.E.2d 35, 41 (1989) (ruling
polygraph evidence no longer admissible for any purpose); Commonwealth v. A Juvenile,
365 Mass. 421, 430-31, 313 N.E.2d 120, 126-27 (1974) (holding polygraph evidence
admissible subject to trial judge's discretion).
63 406 Mass. 201, 547 N.E.2d 35 (1989).

"Id. at 212, 547 N.E.2d at 41. Polygraph evidence is inadmissible for substantive,
impeachment, and corroborative purposes. Id.
6"See i.at 207, 547 N.E.2d at 38 (holding court never determined that appropriate
scientists had accepted validity of polygraph test).
Id. at 203, 547 N.E.2d at 36.
Commonwealth v. Mendes, 406 Mass. 201, 211, 547 N.E.2d 35,41 (1989).
"

Id. at 205, 547 N.E.2d at 37.
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admissibility, the court decided to exclude polygraph test results altogether.
IV. A NEW STANDARD OF ADMISSIBILITY
The standard of admissibility for expert scientific testimony has changed
in the Commonwealth.' In Commonwealth v. Lanigan," the Supreme Judicial
Court held, "without adequately articulated reasons," admission of novel
scientific evidence no longer requires general acceptance.7
Instead,
admissibility depends on establishing the reliability or validity of the underlying
theory or process.72 The new standard, adopted from the United States Supreme
3 further requires
Court decision in Daubertv. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,"
74
that the reliable scientific testimony assist the trier of fact.
In Daubert the Supreme Court held that the Federal Rules of Evidence
overruled the Frye standard." Specifically, Federal Rule 702, which regulates
the admission of scientific testimony, replaced the rigid general acceptance
requirement.76 Rule 702 states: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine
a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise." The DaubertCourt interpreted this standard, which appears only
to require helpfulness to the fact finder,78 to also require an assessment of the

* Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 26, 641 N.E.2d 1342, 1349 (1994).
70 419 Mass. 15, 641 N.E.2d 1342 (1994).
71 Id. at 24, 641 N.E.2d at 1348.
' Id. The court asserted this new admissibility standard "is consistent with our test
of demonstrated reliability." Id.
509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
74 Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 25, 641 N.E.2d 1342, 1349 (1994).
7

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 requires an inquiry into whether the scientific opinion
testimony will help the fact finder. Id. The Supreme Judicial Court noted that
Massachusetts Proposed Rule of Evidence 702 contains the same language as Federal Rule
of Evidence 702. Id. This inquiry, which indicates the relevance of the evidence, was not
actually made by the LaniganCourt. Id. The Lanigan Court's brief analysis focused only
upon the reliability of DNA probability matching. Id. at 25-27, 641 N.E.2d at 1349-50.
7'Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597, 113 S.Ct. at 2794.
76 Id.
7

FED. R. EVID. 702.

'See Lanigan 419 Mass. at 25, 641 N.E.2d at 1349 (discussing Daubert opinion).
The Supreme Judicial Court in Lanigan noted that the Supreme Court in Daubert found a
requirement of reliability "implicit in rule 702, which on its face uses helpfulness to the
trier of fact as the test of admissibility of expert testimony based on scientific knowledge."
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reliability of the proposed evidence.79
The first of this two-part inquiry establishing the method or theory's
scientific reliability involves a flexible application of several factors to the
proposed evidence.' The Court deemed this inquiry necessary under both Rules
702 and 104(a), which require trial court judges to decide, as a question of law,
the preliminary questions concerning the qualifications of a person to be a
witness and the admissibility of evidence."' The DaubertCourt suggested that
an assessment of the theory's falsifiability, peer review and publication, known
or potential error rate, and general acceptance would indicate the validity or
reliability of the proposed theory. 2 After this initial assessment, the court must
then determine whether the scientific knowledge will assist the fact finder.3
This second inquiry essentially involves a determination of the relevance of the
scientific opinion testimony. While relevance inquiries require the evidence
relate to an issue in the case, Rule 702 requires "a valid scientific connection"
to an issue in question.' Finally, even if a court finds the theory or method both
reliable and relevant, the court retains the discretion to exclude any evidence
having more prejudicial effect than probative value pursuant to Rule 403."
In Lanigan, the Supreme Judicial Court used the suggestions of the
DaubertCourt in ruling on the admissibility of DNA probability matching and
the use of the "ceiling principle."' In determining the method's reliability, the
court first analyzed whether the technique had been tested."7 While the court
recognized the necessity of more testing, it concluded that it expected this need
in a developing scientific technique.' In examining peer review, the court found
substantial disagreement among experts regarding the application of the "ceiling
principle." Nevertheless, the court iterated that it did not require unanimity of

Id.
"' Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 570, 590, 113 S. Ct. 2786,
2795 (1993).
Id. at 593-94, 113 S. Ct. at 2796-97.
s Id.
82 Id.
83

Id. at 592-93, 113 S. Ct. at 2795-96.

'4 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 570, 592-93, 113 S. Ct. 2786,
2795-96 (1993).
s' Id. at 95, 113 S. Ct. at 2798.
'4

Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 26, 641 N.E.2d 1342, 1349 (1994).

7 id.
uoId.
" Id. at 26-27, 641 N.E.2d at 1349.
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opinion among the relevant scientists.9 In analyzing known or potential error
rate, the Lanigan court appeared content that any error in the "ceiling principle"
calculation would not result in a disadvantage to the defendant. 9' Finally, due
to the disagreement among population geneticists, DNA probability matching
had not attained general acceptance.' Despite these findings on the reliability
of the "ceiling principle", the court held admission of evidence in the trial as
proper-9 The court failed, however, to address the relevance or any prejudicial
effects of admission of the evidence. Even though the Lanigan court claimed
that Daubert provided "little guidance" in applying the new admissibility
standard, the court's brief analysis appears to follow the reliability criteria. 94
The importance of the Lanigan decision, therefore, lies not only with its
adoption of a new admissibility standard, but also with its adherence to the
criteria suggested by the Supreme Court in how to meet this standard.
Since Lanigan, the court has briefly addressed application of the new
standard to polygraph evidence.95 While a procedural flaw in Commonwealth
v. Stewart' prevented the court from ruling on admissibility, the court
nonetheless discussed how a proponent could establish the reliability of
polygraph evidence.97 This brief reference indicated that courts will assess the
reliability of polygraphy on a case by case basis, requiring the examiner to prove
their qualifications through their accuracy rate in previously administered tests."

'o Id. at 26, 641 N.E.2d at 1349.
"' Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 26, 641 N.E.2d 1342, 1349 (1994).
92 id.
" Id. The court's entire analysis of the "ceiling principle's" reliability occupies only
one paragraph. Id.
Id. at 25-27, 641 N.E.2d at 1348-49.

See Commonwealth v. Stewart, 422 Mass. 385, 389, 663 N.E.2d 255, 259 (1996)

(stating reliability of theory underlying polygraph testing must be established prior to
admission). The Stewart case established that polygraphy will no longer be held to the Frye
general acceptance standard. Id. But see Commonwealth v. LaCaprucia, 41 Mass. App. Ct.
496, 502, 671 N.E.2d 984, 989 (1996) (stating Supreme Judicial Court has "given no
indication" that it will abandon Frye in polygraph context).
9 422 Mass. 385, 663 N.E.2d 255 (1996).

'7 Id. at 389, 663 N.E.2d at 259. Ruling that a post trial polygraph exam was not
newly discovered evidence, Justice Wilkins discussed the requirement polygraph

proponents must show to establish the requisite reliability. Id.
Id. The Stewart court stated:
If polygraphic evidence is to be admissible in a given case, it seems likely
that its reliability will be established by proof in a given case that a qualified

tester who conducted the test had in similar circumstances demonstrated,
in a statistically valid number of independently verified and controlled tests,
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Unlike the four reliability factors enunciated in Daubert, which focus on a
method's validity in the abstract, the Supreme Judicial Court will likely require
additional proof of the validity of the particular test.
A proponent of polygraph opinion testimony in Massachusetts must
establish the reliability of the polygraph method, the reliability of the particular
test, the relevance of the testimony, and prove that the probative value outweighs
any prejudicial effect. The following analysis will review federal court
application of Daubertto polygraphy, and Massachusetts precedent, in helping
to make that determination.

V. ANALYSIS
A. Reliability Inquiry
Two federal district courts found polygraphy reliable after conducting a
thorough analysis under the Daubertcriteria.' While one of those courts strictly
inquired into the four factors suggested in Daubert,' ° the other added additional
criteria resembling the requirement hinted at in Stewart.' A close review of
each court's analysis should assist a proponent of polygraph evidence in the
Commonwealth to establish the requisite reliability.
The first of the two cases, United States v. Crumby0 2 decided by United
States District Court for the District of Arizona, strictly adhered to the Daubert
criteria in determining reliability." 3 In considering whether polygraphy had been
tested, subjected to peer review, evaluated for known or potential error rates, and
achieved general acceptance, the Crumby court considered testimony from Dr.
David Raskin, a leading expert in polygraphy. "° The Crumby court first
inquired into the extent polygraphy has been tested by scientific method."5 Dr.

the high level of accuracy of the conclusions that the tester reached in those
tests.

Id.
" See United States v. Crumby, 895 F. Supp. 1354, 1361 (D. Ariz. 1995) (holding
polygraph reliable under Daubert and Federal Rule of Evidence 702); United States v.
Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. 877, 890-95 (D.N.M. 1995) (applying Daubert).

"0 Crumby, 895 F. Supp. at 1358.
'0' Galbreth,908 F. Supp. at 893.
'02 895 F. Supp. 1354 (D. Ariz. 1995).
103 Id. at 1358.
,' Id. Dr. Raskin holds a Masters degree and a Ph.D in psychology from the
University of California at Los Angeles, belongs to many professional and honorary
organizations, and has published articles in polygraphy. Id. Additionally, Dr. Raskin
testified at an evidentiary hearing before the court on the reliability of polygraphy. Id.
'03 United States v. Crumby, 895 F. Supp. 1354, 1359 (D. Ariz. 1995).
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Raskin testified that the control question examination, the kind administered in
that case, and the most commonly used technique, is based on scientific method
and has been subjected to extensive testing. 6 After explaining how to conduct
a control question examination, Dr. Raskin testified to the scientific techniques
used to measure involuntary physiological responses. 117 Based on this testimony
and other authorities, the Crumby court found that the science of polygraphy has
been subjected to "vigorous scientific testing" and the underlying assumptions
of the method "deeply analyzed" by both polygraphers and
psychophysiologists.'1 The court found the first Daubertrequirement satisfied
because many scientific tests have validated the science of polygraphy.'09
After reviewing scholarly articles critiquing studies and findings of those
in the field, the court recognized the existence of "extensive peer review and
publication" in the science of polygraphy and its underlying assumptions." 0
Finding this Daubertrequirement satisfied, the court then examined polygraph's
known and potential error rates."' Again Dr. Raskin testified that studies he
conducted, along with numerous others, consistently produced an accuracy rate
of approximately ninety percent.'2 Specifically, Dr. Raskin testified to a five
percent error rate for tests depicting truthful subjects and a ten percent error rate
for tests depicting deceptive subjects. "3 This testimony, deemed persuasive by
the court, led to the conclusion that the error rates in polygraphy "are extremely
low, especially when compared to other more inexact forensic sciences. '"4
Finding these first three reliability indicators satisfied, the court turned to
an examination of polygraph's general acceptance in the relevant scientific
community." 5 While the court did not view this factor as significant, it did
16
review a study indicating substantial acceptance by psychophysiologists.
Further, the court found endorsement from a number of organizations and

'o Id.
10 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id.

110United States v. Crumby, 895 F. Supp. 1354, 1395 (D. Ariz. 1995).
"' Id. at 1360.
112

Id.

11 Id. at 1359. Based on these statistics, Dr. Raskin explained it is twice as likely an
innocent subject will wrongly be deemed deceptive than a guilty subject will wrongly be
deemed innocent. Id.
"4

United States v. Crumby, 895 F. Supp. 1354, 1360 (D. Ariz. 1995).

13Id. at 1360.
Id.

116
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polygraphers. Thus, the Crumby court found "widespread" acceptance
satisfying the final factor." 7
The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, in United
States v. Galbreth,reviewed the same factors as the Crumby court but included
additional inquiries specifically for ruling on a polygraph's reliability."" Like
the Crumby court, the Galbreth court first reviewed the quantity and quality of
laboratory and field studies of the control question technique." 9 The Galbreth
court found these tests could determine the scientific validity of the technique
and in fact revealed its high degree of accuracy. 120 The court then examined
several journal articles written by experts in the field of polygraphy, including
Dr.Raskin's.' While hundreds of published articles exist on this technique, the
court most closely considered the peer-reviewed journal articles finding such
scrutiny a "component of good science." ' 22 In reviewing the accuracy rate of
polygraphy, the Galbrethcourt accepted the testimony of Dr. Raskin that exams
properly administered by highly qualified examiners produce an accuracy rate
of approximately ninety percent." In reviewing general acceptance in the
relevant scientific community, the court found a "high degree of acceptance"
among well-informed members of the community. 24
In addition to these four Daubertfactors, the Galbreth court also required
the existence and maintenance of standards regulating those who administer the
exams.1s The court found more than twenty states require examiners to obtain
a license and that federal guidelines require examiners attend a certifying
polygraph school and to have their work reviewed. 26 More significantly, the
Galbrethcourt also required proof of the proper administration of the polygraph
exam."v So, while the Daubertfactors required establishment of the method's
reliability, the Galbrethcourt required establishment of the reliability of the test

11

See id. (emphasizing minimal importance of general acceptance in reliability

inquiry).
118

United States v. Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. 877, 890-94 (D.N.M. 1995).

19

See id.
at 885-88 (reviewing details of Dr. Raskin's laboratory and field studies).

120

Id. at 891.

121

Id.

122 Id.
123

United States v. Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. 877, 892 (D.N.M. 1995).

'2

Id. at 892-93.
Id. at 892.
Id.

'2
126
127

See id. at 893-94 (requiring proper application of polygraph technique in

individual case).
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administered to a particular defendant.": This inquiry focused on both the
examiner's competence to administer an exam and the conditions of the
particular test.'
While the Galbreth court was unsure whether Daubert

required a finding ofvalidity for the specific application of a scientific technique,
it deemed it "imperative" in the context of polygraph. 0 The court deemed this
additional inquiry necessary due to the nature of the polygraph technique. A
reliable polygraph result rests entirely on a properly conducted exam by a
competent examiner therefore the validity of an exam must be established by
more than merely establishing the theory's reliability in the abstract.'13
A comparison of the reliability analysis conducted by the Crumby and
Galbreth courts with the analysis conducted by the Supreme Judicial Court in
Lanigan leads to a conclusion that polygraphy can meet the reliability inquiry.
In reviewing whether the "ceiling principle" had been tested, the Lanigan court
conceded that, as a new technique, more testing needed to be done. 132 In
examining peer review, the Lanigan court recognized substantial disagreement
among the experts on the application of the principle. Regarding the error rate,
the Lanigan court did not require a specific percentage, but rather was satisfied
that any error would weigh in the defendant's favor. Finally, due to the
substantial disagreement among the population geneticists, the principle falls
short of attaining general acceptance.
While the Supreme Judicial Court conducted a relaxed inquiry into the
ceiling principle's reliability, Crumby and Galbreth show that even if the court
subjects polygraph to a more thorough inquiry, the standard can be met. Based
on the dicta in Stewart, however, a proponent of expert testimony based on
polygraph results should anticipate the Commonwealth will require proof in any
given case of the validity of the particular exam. As a result, a practitioner
should hire a licensed polygraph examiner with substantial experience in
administering the control question technique to validate the individual test.
B. Relevance Inquiry
The relevance inquiry envisioned by the Daubert court requires the
scientific opinion testimony to have a "valid scientific connection" to an issue

'2'

United States v. Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. 877, 893-94 (D.N.M. 1995).

129 Id.
130 See id. at 880-82 (surmising Daubert opinion's abstract analysis inadvertently
omitted this requirement).
131

Id.

132See

supra notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
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in question.'33 This inquiry does not seem to pose a problem for polygraph
evidence because any time a defendant's answers indicate truthfulness or
deceptiveness on a relevant question it will be pertinent to the issue in question.
In Galbreth, for example, the defendant stood accused of failure to report
income on his income tax return.' The result of his polygraph exam indicated
truthful responses regarding his knowledge and intent. 3 ' Therefore, the
Galbrethcourt concluded that the testimony related to the issue in question and
provided a "valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry.' 1'
Thus, the
relevance inquiry appears to impose only a slight burden upon a proponent of
polygraph opinion testimony.
C PrejudicialEffect of PolygraphEvidence
A proposed rule in Massachusetts may also establish grounds for barring
polygraph exams by excluding evidence whose prejudicial effect outweighs its
probative value. Massachusetts' Proposed Rule of Evidence 403 allows courts
to exclude all relevant and reliable evidence carrying "the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by consideration of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of evidence." Under this
balancing test, Massachusetts' courts could exclude polygraph evidence,
although the Crumby and Galbreth Courts still admitted it after this inquiry.
An example of the court citing prejudicial effects as grounds to exclude
polygraph exams is found in Mendes' 37 After eliminating the Frye exception
and returning to per se inadmissibility, the Mendes court listed several
prejudicial effects of admitting polygraph evidence.' 3 Concerns included juries
giving undue weight to expert testimony, experts infringing upon the jury's role
of determining credibility, polygraph evidence deciding guilt or innocence, and
the cost and time required to verify an expert's qualifications.' 3 9
In the fifteen years prior to Mendes, however, several of the Supreme
Judicial Court's opinions contemplated these potentially prejudicial effects.
Rather than exclude polygraph evidence, the court decided to limit the purposes
for admitting polygraph evidence. In Vitello, after considering the possibility of

' Daubertv. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 591-92, 113 S. Ct. 2786,
2796 (1993).
" United States v. Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. 877, 895 (D.N.M. 1995).
135Id.
13 Id.
'37Commonwealth

138Id.
'39

Id.

v. Mendes, 406 Mass. 201, 211-12, 547 N.E.2d 35, 41 (1989).
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polygraph evidence confusing or prejudicing the jury, usurping the jury's
function and wasting trial resources, the court decided to confine admission, but
only to impeach or corroborate a defendant's testimony. 40 Despite the
possibility of prejudice, the court still found value in using 4polygraph exams for
a limited purpose rather than eliminating its use entirely.' '
VI. CONCLUSION
After a searching analysis, it appears that polygraphy can meet this new
admissibility standard and will finally receive consistent treatment in the
Commonwealth. While determining the scientific reliability of polygraphy using
the new standard involves a substantial undertaking, the benefits of polygraphy
can only enhance the truth seeking function of the trial courts.
Angela Lackard
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Commonwealth v. Vitello, 376 Mass. 426, 451-52, 381 N.E.2d 582, 596-97

(1978).
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